There is a mistaken perception that 'metaphor theory' and 'conceptual blending' are competing views, and that there is some argument between us over this. The real situation is this: We have been good friends and colleagues for over forty years, and we remain so. We fully respect, and make use of, each other's work. We are both scientists, who do both empirical research and theorizing. We see the research programs developed for metaphor and blending as mutually reinforcing and often deeply intertwined, rather than at odds with each other. So why do some see discord where we find remarkable convergence? The short answer is that over the years, we focused on what we were most interested in, with corresponding differences of emphasis and interpretation. To explain how all this unfolded, and dispel the view that pits metaphor against blending, we need to go over the basic developments over time in the study of conceptual metaphor and blends, and then do a comparison.
CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR
Research on conceptual metaphor went through various stages.
(1) Metaphors We Live By was worked out in 1979 and published in 1980. It assumed that conceptual metaphors were cognitive mappings from frame to frame across domains. It observed that certain metaphors had an 'experiential basis'. Others seemed not to.
(2) Mid-1980s: There were various discoveries. Some metaphors appeared to be widespread across language areas. The cross-linguistic ones all had common experiential bases.
Metaphorical mappings appeared to 'preserve image schema structure', and the inferences that came with the image-schema structure of source domain frames. Complex conceptual metaphors were shown to be combinations of simpler metaphors, imageschemas, and frames. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL SPACE AND BLENDING THEORY
Research on mental spaces went through various stages: 
BLENDING IN THE NEURAL THEORY
During the 1990s, when blending research was expanding, neural research at Berkeley was highly focused on neural binding research. Lakoff, looking at Narayanan's neural theory of metaphor and accounts of neural binding, concluded that at the neural level, the blending theory's generalization across mappings in metaphors and blends did not hold at the neural level. Different circuitry was needed. According to Lakoff, neural binding circuitry is necessary to accomplish blending, but is insufficient for metaphorical mappings. This is discussed in Lakoff's 2009 paper on the neural theory of metaphor in Raymond Gibbs' collection, The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor. Lakoff argues that the governing principles and optimality constraints on blends, which he accepts as empirically correct, follow from the best-fit principles governing neural circuitry. Blends can be represented in formal notation in current neural linguistics.
METAPHOR IN BLENDING THEORY
In the same collection by Gibbs, Fauconnier and Turner have a paper showing how metaphors as surface products can result from complex integration networks with multiple metaphorical mappings, metonymic mappings and blended spaces. TIME as SPACE is the case study. This account is sharply different from the ones given in early metaphor and blending theories. But interestingly, it seems totally compatible with the binding mechanisms proposed within Neural Linguistics, in which neural bindings of metaphors, metonymies, and blends, appear to be able to cover the same range of cases.
A COMPARISON
Note that both of us -Fauconnier and Lakoff -were engaged in empirical and theoretical science over the same years, but in the mid-nineties Lakoff explicitly adopted a neurally-based paradigm.
Both approaches assumed the empirical correctness of conceptual metaphor, mental spaces, and 
WHY THERE IS NO CONFLICT
Our brief recapitulation stresses the obvious: for over thirty years, the different strands of research on conceptual mappings within cognitive linguistics have continuously reinforced each other, producing worthwhile generalizations and deeper understanding along the way. There would be no conceptual blending framework without conceptual metaphor theory, and there would be no neural linguistics without the elaborate linguistic analysis carried out in the 1980s and '90s.
This last point deserves some emphasis: neural linguistics is exciting and successful because it brings in not only biological and computational dimensions of neural systems but also wellestablished cognitive results obtained through theoretical analysis and extensive empirical observation.
If you are a researcher, you generally have to choose detailed methods of analysis. If there is a need to choose, the choices appear to the chooser to be in conflict. They aren't. You can choose both, for different aspects of your analysis, depending on what is needed for your purposes. The neural theory happens to use a notation for cognitive linguistics that makes no mention of neural circuitry, but can map onto neural circuitry in a straightforward way.
What is important is a recognition that different enterprises developed with seemingly different purposes and different theoretical constructs can mutually reinforce each other, lead to deeper convergent perspectives, and achieve wide-ranging scientific goals. This is clearly what we also see in arguably more mature sciences like physics or biology.
One of the central points of agreement between us is that traditional linguistic research looking at a vast range of data and generalizing over the data is the basic empirical methodology of linguistics and one of the most important empirical methodologies in cognitive science. But the term 'empirical' seems to get confused with 'experimental'. Experiments are a welcome source of additional, and sometimes crucial, empirical material. But we note a tendency to call anything that's not experimental, 'non-empirical' and so by implication 'speculative', 'unproven', etc. As a result, we notice a trend in moving away from the great strength of cognitive linguistics: the analysis of massive amounts of linguistic data -especially in the area of semantics. We look forward to a return to that tradition.
